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Objectives: Decision-making frameworks that draw on economic evaluations increasingly use equity weights to facilitate a
more equitable and fair allocation of healthcare resources. These weights can be attached to health gains or reflected in the
monetary threshold against which the incremental cost-effectiveness ratios of (new) health technologies are evaluated.
Currently applied weights are based on different definitions of disease severity and do not account for age-related
preferences in society. However, age has been shown to be an important equity-relevant characteristic. This study
examines the willingness to pay (WTP) for health-related quality of life (QOL) gains in relation to the disease severity and
age of patients, and the outcome of the disease.
Methods: We obtained WTP estimates by applying contingent-valuation tasks in a representative sample of the public in The
Netherlands (n = 2023). We applied random-effects generalized least squares regression models to estimate the effect of
patients’ disease severity and age, size of QOL gains, disease outcome (full recovery/death 1 year after falling ill), and
respondent characteristics on the WTP.
Results: Respondents’WTP was higher for more severely ill and younger patients and for larger-sized QOL gains, but lower for
patients who died. However, the relations were nonlinear and context dependent. Respondents with a lower age, who were
male, had a higher household income, and a higher QOL stated a higher WTP for QOL gains.
Conclusions: Our results suggest that—if the aim is to align resource-allocation decisions in healthcare with societal
preferences—currently applied equity weights do not suffice.
Keywords: age, end of life, health-related quality of life, severity of illness, willingness to pay.
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An important objective of publicly financed healthcare systems
is to maximize population health given a certain budget
constraint.1 To meet this objective, economic evaluations can be
used to inform decision makers about whether reimbursing a
(new) health technology can be considered good value for money.
In economic evaluations, health gains are often expressed in terms
of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), comprising gains in both
health-related quality of life (QOL) and life expectancy (LE).2,3 The
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of a technology is
evaluated against a monetary threshold that represents the
maximum societal willingness to pay (WTP) for a QALY or the
opportunity costs of spending within the healthcare sector.4-6
Traditionally, a “QALY is a QALY is a QALY” in economic eval-
uations,7 meaning that all health gains are valued equally. How-
ever, equity weights can be attached to health gains or reflected in
the monetary threshold to facilitate a more equitable and fair
allocation of healthcare resources.1,8-12 In the former case, the15 - see front matter Copyright ª 2021, ISPOR–The Professional Society for
cess article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/bequity-adjusted ICER of a technology is evaluated against a fixed
monetary threshold and in the latter case, the (unadjusted) ICER of
a technology is evaluated against a flexible, equity-adjusted
monetary threshold.1,10 These weights can be based on a range
of equity considerations that, for example, are related to charac-
teristics of the patients, disease, or technology.1,12–20 To facilitate
consistent and accountable decision making, it has been advo-
cated to explicitly and transparently integrate such considerations
into the decision-making framework.21–24 Although many coun-
tries (eg, France, Germany, Sweden, and Australia) do this in an ad
hoc, implicit manner,25–27 Norway, The Netherlands, and England
do this in an explicit manner by applying equity weights.28–31 Text
Box 1 includes a brief overview of how the weights are applied in
these countries.
Societal preferences for equity weighting based on disease
severity (defined broadly here to include absolute shortfall, pro-
portional shortfall, and end-of-life considerations associated with
terminal illnesses as described in Text Box 1) are increasingly
studied, also in relation to patients’ age. The available evidenceHealth Economics and Outcomes Research. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an
y/4.0/).
TEXT BOX 1. Application of equity weights in Norway, The Netherlands, and England.
In Norway and The Netherlands, the (unadjusted) incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of a health technology is evaluated
against a monetary threshold that is weighted based on the disease severity of the targeted patient population.11,28,31 In Norway, a
flexible threshold in the range of NOK 275 000 to 825 000 (~V27 500 to V82 500) per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) is (informally)
applied, with a maximum weight of 3 attached for evaluating the ICER of a health technology that targets patients with the highest
level of disease severity (ie, an absolute shortfall of $20 QALYs).31–33 Absolute shortfall is calculated as the disease-related loss of
remaining QALYs without the new health technology, compared to the remaining QALY expectation in absence of the disease.31,34,35
In The Netherlands, a flexible threshold in the range of V20 000 to V80 000 per QALY gained is applied, with a maximumweight of 4
attached for evaluating the ICER of a health technology that targets patients with the highest level of disease severity (ie, a
proportional shortfall of 0.71–1.00).11,28,29 Proportional shortfall is calculated as the proportion of absolute shortfall, relative to the
remaining QALY expectation in absence of the disease and measured on a scale from 0 “no QALY loss” to 1 “complete QALY loss”.8,28
Health technologies that target patients with the lowest level of disease severity (ie, a proportional shortfall of ,0.10) are generally
not recommended for reimbursement.28,36,37 In England, a weight in the range of 1.7 to 2.5 can be attached to QALYs that are
gained by prolonging the lives of terminally ill patients (normally with a remaining life expectancy of #24 months) by at least 3
months.30 The resulting (equity-adjusted) ICER of a health technology is then evaluated against the common threshold range of £20
000 to £30 000 (~V23 000 to V34 500).30 Note that the weights are currently applied in decisions on the reimbursement of new
health technologies, not in decisions on the displacement of other technologies that may follow as a result (eg, in England30,38).
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relevant characteristic (often reflected by giving a higher weight to
health gains in younger patients), possibly even more important
than disease severity.1,5,11,39–42 Nevertheless, the weights applied
in Norway, The Netherlands, and—classifying terminally ill pa-
tients as severely ill43—England are all based on disease severity.
These weights do not directly account for patients’ age nor aim to
weight age in resource-allocation decisions, even though they
may be inextricably related to patients’ age.11 For example, the
weights based on absolute shortfall in Norway may implicitly
prioritize younger over older patients, and, conversely, the
weights based on proportional shortfall in The Netherlands and
end-of-life considerations in England may implicitly prioritize
older over younger patients.11,44–46
The aim of this study was to examine the willingness to pay
(WTP) for health gains in relation to the disease severity and age
of patients and to examine whether the WTP was different be-
tween health gains in patients who fully recovered and patients
who died (1 year after falling ill). Based on the available evidence
on societal preferences in this context, we hypothesized that WTP
would be higher for more severely ill and younger patients, and
for patients who can be considered terminally ill. We further hy-
pothesized that the elicited WTP would be sensitive to scale and
to household income, indicating the theoretical validity of the
elicited WTP.47
We elicited the WTP for health gains in terms of an increase in
monthly basic health-insurance premium in a representative
sample of the general public in The Netherlands, as this relates
directly to the payment vehicle used for collectively funding
healthcare in this country. Given the aim of our study, we focus on
the relative rather than absolute WTP for health gains. The results
of this study may inform decisions on the relative size of severity-
and/or age-dependent equity weights and on the range and shape
of monetary thresholds used to evaluate the ICERs of health
technologies. The results are considered to be of particular interest
to Norway, The Netherlands, and England given their current use
of equity weights, but also to other countries that (intend to)
integrate equity and efficiency considerations into their formal
decision-making framework.Methods
Sample and Data Collection
We designed a contingent-valuation (CV) study that was
administered online by a professional research agency (Dynata).
Respondents were quota sampled to be representative of the
general public in The Netherlands in terms of age (18-75 years),
sex, and education level and to obtain a broad range in household
income. Before conducting the main study in August 2019, we
conducted a pilot study in a small sample (n = 100) to test the
range of the payment scale and clarity of the tasks. The results of
this study did not lead to modifications, and hence we merged the
pilot and main data before conducting the analyses (total sample
n = 2023).
Before respondents completed the questionnaire, we explained
that healthcare resources are scarce and decision makers use in-
formation on societal preferences to allocate the available re-
sources in an optimal manner for society. We asked respondents
to complete the CV tasks from a socially-inclusive-personal (SIP)
perspective.48 This implied that they had to take into consider-
ation the possibility that they themselves, their family, friends,
and/or acquaintances could be part of the hypothetical patient
group as well as unknown others. As the SIP perspective repre-
sents a combination of the personal and social perspectives,48
applying it may be seen as yielding relevant WTP estimates for
health gains in the context of a collectively funded healthcare
system like that of The Netherlands.48,49 Upon completion of the
questionnaire, respondents received a fee of 50 eurocents that
they could save in a personal account or donate to charity.
Questionnaire
The questionnaire consisted of 4 parts. In part 1, we introduced
respondents to the following concepts using text and graphs: (1)
QOL, operationalized on a visual analogue scale (VAS) ranging
from 0 “dead” to 100 “full health”; (2) disease severity, oper-
ationalized as disease-related QOL loss (in points from 100 on the
VAS) in patients who fully recovered and as a combination of QOL
and LE (in years) loss in patients who died 1 year after falling ill;
TEXT BOX 2. Contingent-valuation procedure.
Willingness to pay was elicited by applying a 2-step contingent-valuation procedure, consisting of a payment scale and a bounded
open-ended question.50 The payment scale ranged from a V0 to V24 increase in monthly basic health-insurance premium with
unevenly distributed intervals between the value points (ie, V0, V0.50, V1, V1.50, V2, V2.50, V3, V4, V5, V6, V7, V8, V10, V12, V14,
V16, V18, V20, V22, V24, and “more”). Note that monthly payment of health-insurance premiums is mandatory for adults (181) in
The Netherlands. By approximation, the number of adults was 13.7 million and the monthly basic health-insurance premium
was V115.00 per person in 2019.51 In step 1, we asked respondents to inspect the payment scale from left to right and indicate the
increase in monthly premium they were certainly willing to pay for the duration of 1 year. We then asked them to again inspect the
payment scale from left to right and indicate the increase in monthly premium they would certainly not be willing to pay for the
duration of 1 year. In step 2, we asked respondents to indicate the maximum increase in monthly premium they would be willing to
pay within the range obtained in step 1. In both steps, we asked respondents to take their net monthly household income into
account as a proxy for their ability to pay. We asked respondents who stated a WTP of V0 in step 1 to explain their main reason for
having this preference by completing an open-text field or checking 1 of 6 randomized answer options. Three answer options
related to true zero valuations (ie, “I cannot afford to pay more than V0”, “Treating these patients is not worth more than V0 to me”,
and “I believe the treatment is worth more than V0, but I would rather spend my money on something else”), and 3 answer options
related to protest zero valuations (ie, “I am against an increase in monthly basic health-insurance premium”, “Patients should pay for
the treatment themselves”, and “The value of health and healthcare cannot be expressed in monetary terms”). The open-text field
answers were qualitatively assessed by the first 2 authors and subsequently classified as either a true or protest zero valuation.
-- 3and (3) treatment-related QOL gain (in points on the VAS). We
familiarized respondents with the concepts and tasks by asking
them to assess their own QOL “today” on the VAS and complete a
practice task from a personal perspective.48 After completing this
task, we asked respondents to assess its level of clarity on a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 “very unclear” to 7 “very clear”
and to indicate on what they would likely economize to cover the
stated WTP to increase their awareness of the associated oppor-
tunity costs.
In part 2, respondents completed 2 tasks from a SIP perspective
for which they were randomly assigned to 2 out of 20 scenarios.
Each scenario started with the introduction of a group of 10 000
patients aged 10, 20, 40, or 70. We explained that the patients
would have lived in full health (a score of 100 on the VAS) until
the age of 80 had they not fallen ill. Due to the disease, their QOL
decreased from 100 to either 90, 70, 50, 30, or 10 on the VAS for
the duration of 1 year. After this year, they would fully recover (ie,
a score of 100 on the VAS). The disease would not affect their LE.
We explained that a treatment was available that would increase
patients’ QOL with 10 points on the VAS during the year of illness
and that the treatment type and costs were the same for all pa-
tients. The treatment could be made available to patients by
increasing the monthly basic health insurance premium for the
duration of 1 year. This increase would apply to all adult in-
habitants of The Netherlands. We elicited respondents’ WTP for
the treatment-related QOL gains by applying the 2-step procedure
described in Text Box 2. After respondents completed the second
task, we asked them to indicate how certain they were of actually
paying the stated WTP in case the increase became effective
immediately, on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “very un-
certain” to 7 “very certain”.
In part 3, respondents completed 1 additional task from a SIP
perspective for which they were randomly assigned to 1 out of 20
scenarios that were evenly distributed across 5 modules. In
modules 124, the level of disease severity was 50, treatment-
related QOL gain was 20 points (modules 1 and 3) or 50 points
(modules 2 and 4), and patients either fully recovered (modules 1
and 2) or died (modules 3 and 4) 1 year after falling ill. We used
the data frommodules 1 and 2, and from the scenarios in part 2 in
which the level of disease severity was also 50 to examine
whether respondents’ WTP was sensitive to scale.47 We used thedata from modules 124 to examine whether respondents’ WTP
for similar-sized QOL gains was different between gains in pa-
tients who fully recovered and patients who died. In module 5, we
focused on a different question that is reported elsewhere.
Appendix A includes a task example and Appendix B an overview
of the scenario characteristics (see Supplemental Materials found
at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2021.01.012).
In part 4, we asked respondents about their sociodemographic
characteristics.
Statistical Analyses and Hypotheses
Before conducting the analyses, we excluded protest zero val-
uations (see Text Box 2), outliers, and speeders. We identified
outliers based on the distribution of stated WTPs (z-score $1.64).
We classified respondents who completed the 3 tasks in less than
90 seconds as speeders, based on a timed test of completing the
tasks by 3 researchers not involved in this study.
We calculated the raw mean (SD; 95% CI) WTP for QOL gains
in all scenarios and the difference in raw mean (SE; 95% CI) WTP
for similar sized QOL gains in patients who fully recovered and
patients who died 1 year after falling ill. We applied 2-tailed
Welch’s t-tests (Bonferroni corrected) to examine whether the
latter was statistically significantly different from 0. Further-
more, we applied 7 random-effects generalized least squares
models to estimate the effect of scenario and respondent char-
acteristics on the WTP. Models 1 and 2 were based on the data
obtained in part 2 of the questionnaire and included the scenario
characteristics disease severity and age of patients, and their
interaction. Models 3 to 6 were based on the data obtained in
part 2 and 3 of the questionnaire. Model 3 included the scenario
characteristics disease severity, age of patients, size of QOL gains,
and disease outcome (full recovery/death, 1 year after falling ill).
Model 4 also included the interaction between the disease
severity and age of patients. Models 5 to 7 consecutively
included the interactions between the disease severity and age
of patients, size of QOL gains and age of patients, and disease
outcome and age of patients as well as the respondent charac-
teristics age, age2, sex, children (yes/no), education level,
household income (adjusted for household size using an elas-
ticity scale of 0.5 to account for economies of scale52), and QOL.































Completion time of CV
tasks (minutes) 6.0 (27.7)
4 VALUE IN HEALTH - 2021We assumed that respondents might have used their first WTP
stated from a SIP perspective as a reference (anchor) in the
subsequent tasks. After testing this assumption, we decided to
account for a time effect in all models (labeled “CV task”).53 A
downward adjustment of a previously stated WTP could also
indicate a violation of the monotonicity principle that a larger-
sized QOL gain should, ceteris paribus, result in a higher
WTP.54 Therefore, we performed sensitivity analyses to examine
the robustness of our results by repeating the analyses excluding
respondents who, ceteris paribus, stated a lower WTP for larger
QOL gains. We also examined the robustness of our results by
alternately repeating the analyses excluding respondents who
reported a low clarity score (ie, 123 level) for the practice task,
reported a low certainty score (ie, 123 level) for actually paying
the stated WTP, and completed the 3 tasks in less than 39
(instead of the predetermined 90) seconds based on the distri-
bution of completion times (z-score #-1.64). Furthermore, we
examined the effect of respondents’ proximity to the age of pa-
tients and of respondents’ stated WTP in the practice task on the
WTP.
Before conducting the analyses, we hypothesized that re-
spondents’ WTP would be higher for QOL gains in more severely
ill patients (ie, patients with a higher level of disease severity and
patients who died 1 year after falling ill) and for QOL gains in
younger patients. Moreover, we hypothesized that respondents’
WTP would be sensitive to scale and to household income in the
sense that the WTP would be higher for larger-sized QOL gains
and for respondents with a relatively higher household income.
Evidence in support of the latter hypothesis would indicate the
theoretical validity of the elicited WTP.47
We conducted the analyses using Stata 16.1 (Stata Corp LP,
College Station, TX).CV indicates contingent valuation; NS, not stated; QOL, health-related quality of
life; VAS, visual analogue scale (ranging from 0 “dead” to 100 “full health”).
*Consistent protest zero valuations (n = 73), outliers (n = 31), speeders (n = 540),
and respondents who met more than one exclusion criterion (n = 62) are
excluded from the table.
†Age is based on statistics for the population aged 18-75 years, sex is based on
statistics for the overall population, and education level is based on statistics
for the population aged 15-75 years. Population statistics for 2019; source:
Statistics Netherlands (https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline).
‡Low = lower vocational and primary school, Medium = middle vocational and
secondary school, High = higher vocational and academic education.Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample (n =
1317) that remained after excluding protest zero valuations (n =
73), outliers (n = 31), and speeders (n = 602). Of the speeders, 50
also gave protest zero valuations, and 12 also stated an outlying
WTP. The statistics indicate that the sample was representative of
the general public in The Netherlands in terms of sex and edu-
cation level, but somewhat older.
The remaining respondents assessed the mean (SD) clarity of
the practice task at 5.9 (1.1) and certainty of actually paying the
stated WTP at 5.4 (1.3) on the 7-point Likert scale. A total of 50
(3.8%) respondents reported a low clarity score, 98 (8.3%) a low
certainty score, and 37 (2.8%) stated, ceteris paribus, a lower WTP
for a larger-sized QOL gain.
Table 2 presents the raw mean (SD; 95% CI) WTP for QOL gains
of 10 points in patients who fully recovered 1 year after falling ill.
On average, the WTP was V8.0 per month for the duration of 1
year. The results indicate that respondents’ WTP was generally
higher for QOL gains in more severely ill patients (average WTP:
V7.3 to V8.4) and younger patients (average WTP: V7.8 to V8.4);
however, the relations were nonlinear. We observed a relatively
low average WTP of V8.0 for QOL gains in patients with a severity
level of 50 and a relatively high averageWTP of V8.4 for QOL gains
in patients with a severity level of 70. We also observed a rela-
tively low average WTP of V7.9 for QOL gains in patients aged 20.
Because the SDs were relatively large and the 95% CIs largely
overlapped, these results suggest strong preference heterogeneity
and only partially support the hypotheses that respondents’ WTP
is higher for more severely ill and younger patients.Table 3 presents the raw mean (SD; 95% CI) WTP for QOL gains
of 20 and 50 points in patients with a severity level of 50 who fully
recovered and who died 1 year after falling ill (for comparison
presented with the WTP for QOL gains of 10 points in patients
with severity level 50 who fully recovered, copied from Table 2).
These results indicate that respondents’WTP was generally higher
for larger sized QOL gains and “hump shaped” across ages, with a
peak at age 10, 20, or 40 depending on the size of the gain and
whether patients fully recovered or died. Respondents’ WTP was
higher for similar-sized QOL gains in patients who fully recovered
than in patients who died, except for gains of 20 points in patients
aged 20 and 40. Most differences were not statistically significant,
except for the lower mean (SE; 95% CI) WTP of V4.5 (1.8; –8.0,
–1.0) for QOL gains of 50 points in patients aged 20 who died than
in those who fully recovered (Bonferroni corrected, a/4). Although
these results indicate that respondents’ WTP is higher for younger
patients and larger-sized QOL gains, they do not support the hy-
pothesis that respondents’ WTP is higher for patients who die.
Tables 4 and 5 present the regression results. Note that models
1 and 2 are based on the data obtained in part 2, and models 3 to 7
are based on the data obtained part 2 and 3 of the questionnaire.
Table 2. Raw mean (SD; 95% CI) WTP for QOL gains of 10 points in patients who will fully recover 1 year after falling ill (in V).*
Age† Severity‡ Average












123 7.8 (7.1; 6.5, 9.0) 127 8.5 (6.9; 7.3, 9.7) 134 8.2 (6.4; 7.1, 9.3) 127 9.0 (7.7; 7.7, 10.3) 121 8.4 (7.2; 7.1, 9.7) 8.4 (7.0; 7.8, 8.9)
20
118 7.0 (6.5; 5.8, 8.2) 116 7.5 (6.6; 6.3, 8.7) 121 7.3 (6.7; 6.1, 8.5) 130 9.0 (7.2; 7.7, 10.2) 112 8.7 (7.5; 7.3, 10.2) 7.9 (6.9; 7.4, 8.5)
40
118 7.0 (6.9; 5.8, 8.3) 118 8.6 (7.0; 7.4, 9.9) 129 8.5 (7.1; 7.2, 9.7) 133 8.5 (6.4; 7.4, 9.6) 120 7.7 (6.7; 6.4, 8.9) 8.1 (6.8; 7.5, 8.6)
70
116 7.5 (7.3; 6.2, 8.9) 127 8.2 (6.9; 7.0, 9.4) 128 7.8 (7.1; 6.5, 9.0) 110 7.1 (6.3; 5.9, 8.3) 125 8.2 (6.3; 7.1, 9.3) 7.8 (6.8; 7.2, 8.3)
Average
7.3 (6.9; 6.7, 8.0) 8.2 (6.8; 7.6, 8.8) 8.0 (6.8; 7.4, 8.5) 8.4 (6.9; 7.8, 9.0) 8.2 (6.9; 7.6, 8.9) 8.0 (6.9; 7.8, 8.3)
QOL indicates health-related quality of life; WTP, willingness to pay (in V per month for the duration of 1 year).
*Protest zero valuations, outliers (raw WTP $V35.00), and speeders are excluded from this table. In the scenarios, the groups consist of 10 000 patients who fully
recover 1 year after falling ill. The treatment-related QOL gain is 10 points, measured on a visual analogue scale ranging from 0 “death” to 100 “full health”.
†Age at onset of the disease (in years).
‡Severity is operationalized in terms of disease-related QOL loss and measured in points from 100 on the visual analogue scale.
-- 5The results indicate that—compared to severity level 10—a higher
severity level was, ceteris paribus, associated with a higher WTP,
though it was relatively low for patients with severity level 90
(model 1: b 1.08), and it decreased at a marginal rate when data
were aggregated (eg, model 2: b 0.83 to 1.32). Compared to age 10,
a higher age was, ceteris paribus, associated with a lower WTP
(model 1: b –0.25 to b –0.84; model 3: b –0.09 to –1.09), but only
the coefficient for age 70 was statistically significant. The inter-
action between patients’ disease severity and age indicates in
some scenarios that respondents’ WTP for QOL gains in patients
with different levels of disease severity was dependent on theirTable 3. Raw mean (SD; 95% CI) WTP for QOL gains in patients who
Age† Disease outcome 1 year after fal
Full recovery
Part 2 Part 3
Module 1 Module 2








































QOL indicates health-related quality of life (measured in points on a visual analogue s
month for the duration of 1 year).
*Respondents with protest zero valuations, an outlying WTP ($V35.00 in part 2, V26
Module 4), and who completed the tasks too quickly are excluded from this table. In
points on the visual analogue scale.
†Age at onset of the disease (in years).
‡P , .05 (Bonferroni corrected, a = 0.05/4).age. When patients had a severity level of 10, respondents’ WTP
was, ceteris paribus, higher for patients aged 10 than for patients
aged 20 (model 2: b -1.10; model 4: b –1.39; model 5: b –1.50) and
for patients aged 40 (model 2: b –1.22; model 4: b –1.34; model 5:
b –1.45). However, WTP was relatively higher for patients aged 20
from severity level 50 onward (model 2: b 1.14 to 1.63; model 4: b
1.45 to 2.23; model 5: b 1.51 to 2.39) and for patients aged 40 from
severity level 70 onward (model 2: b 1.57; model 4: b 1.35 to 1.92;
model 5: b 1.58 to 2.19). The results further indicate that—
compared to QOL gains of 10 points—QOL gains of 20 and 50
points were, ceteris paribus, associated with a higher WTP thoughwill fully recover and die 1 year after falling ill (in V).*
ling ill Difference
Death
Part 3 Part 3
Module 3 Module 4 Module 3 – 1 Module 4 – 2









































cale, ranging from 0 “dead” to 100 “full health”); WTP, willingness to pay (in V per
.50 in Module 1, $V63.00 in Module 2, $V50.00 in Module 3, and $V32.80 in
the scenarios, the groups consist of 10 000 patients with a severity level of 50
Table 4. Regression results.†
DV: WTP Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4‡




- - - - - - - -
30 0.64** (0.26) 0.13, 1.16 0.41 (0.52) –0.60, 1.42 0.83*** (0.27) 0.30, -1.37 0.40 (0.49) –0.56, 1.36
50 1.07**** (0.27) 0.54, 1.59 0.71 (0.58) –0.43, 1.84 1.19**** (0.27) 0.66, 1.72 0.69 (0.47) –0.23, 1.60
70 1.23**** (0.26) 0.73, 1.73 0.44 (0.53) –0.61, 1.48 1.22**** (0.26) 0.72, 1.73 0.54 (0.48) –0.41 to 1.49
90 1.08**** (0.29) 0.52, 1.64 0.37 (0.55) 0.71, -1.45 1.32**** (0.29) 0.75, 1.90 0.20 (0.56) –0.90, 1.31
Agek (10 =
reference)
- - - - - - - -
20 –0.35 (0.23) –0.88, 0.09 –1.11** (0.50) –2.09, –0.12 –0.09 (0.24) –0.56, 0.37 –1.39*** (0.52) –2.42, –0.37
40 –0.25 (0.23) –0.69, 0.20 –1.22** (0.54) –2.28, –0.17 –0.24 (0.21) –0.62, 0.19 –1.34** (0.53) –2.38, –0.29





- - - -
30 3 20 0.71 (0.65) –0.57, 1.99 1.04 (0.68) –0.30, 2.38
30 3 40 1.06 (0.72) –0.35, 2.47 1.20 (0.75) –0.27, 2.66
30 3 70 –1.05 (0.75) –2.51, 0.42 –0.64 (0.74) –2.10, 0.81
50 3 20 0.33 (0.73) –1.10, 1.75 1.45** (0.67) 0.13, 2.77
50 3 40 1.17 (0.79) –0.39, 2.73 1.18 (0.65) –0.09, 2.46
50 3 70 –0.31 (0.79) –1.86, 1.23 –0.77 (0.64) –2.03, 0.49
70 3 20 1.14 (0.67) –0.19, 2.46 1.54** (0.68) 0.20, 2.87
70 3 40 1.57** (0.72) 0.16, 2.98 1.35** (0.69) 0.00, 2.70
70 3 70 0.30 (0.73) –1.12, 1.73 –0.21 (0.69) –1.56, 1.15
90 3 20 1.63** (0.76) 0.15, 3.12 2.23*** (0.83) 0.61, 3.86
90 3 40 1.05 (0.72) –0.37, 2.47 1.92** (0.77) 0.41, 3.43




- - - -
20 points 1.44**** (0.31) 0.82, 2.05 1.43**** (0.31) 0.82, 2.05




–0.80** (0.34) –1.47, –0.13 –0.79** (0.34) –1.46, –0.12
CV task -0.83**** (0.12) –1.07 to –0.59 –0.81**** (0.12) –1.05, –0.58 –0.85**** (0.13) –1.09, –0.60 –0.84**** (0.12) –1.08, –0.60
Constant 8.93**** (0.35) 8.25-9.62 9.32**** (0.46) 8.42, 10.23 8.89**** (0.35) 8.20, 9.57 9.39**** (0.43) 8.55, 10.24
R2 overall 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
n (observations;
groups)
2521; 1317 2251; 1317 3443; 1308 3443; 1308
CV indicates contingent valuation; DV, dependent variable; NS, not stated; QOL, health-related quality of life; VAS, visual analogue scale (ranging from 0 “dead” to 100
“full health”); WTP, willingness to pay (in V per month for the duration of 1 year).
*P , .1; **P , .05; ***P , .01; ****P , .001.
†Note that models 1 and 2 are based on the data obtained in part 2 and models 3 and 4 are based on the data obtained in part 2 and 3 of the questionnaire. In models 1
and 2, we identified speeders as respondents who completed the 2 tasks in less than 60 seconds (based on timed test of completing the tasks by 3 independent
researchers) in the main analysis and in less than 25 seconds (based on the distribution of completion times; z-score # -1.64) in the sensitivity analysis.
‡Note that the Severity and Age coefficients cannot be directly compared between the models. In models 1 and 3, these coefficients represent main effects, and in
models 2 and 4, these coefficients represent conditional effects.
§Severity is operationalized in terms of disease-related QOL loss and measured in points from 100 on the VAS.
ǁAge at onset of the disease (in years).
{Disease outcome 1 year after falling ill.
6 VALUE IN HEALTH - 2021at a decreasing marginal rate (models 3 to 5: b 1.43 to 1.46 for 20
points and b 2.82 to 2.90 for 50 points) and—compared to gains in
patients who fully recovered—gains in patients who died 1 year
after falling ill were, ceteris paribus, associated with a lower WTP
(models 3 to 6: b -0.74 to -0.80). These results support the hy-
potheses that respondents’ WTP is higher for more severely ill
patients and larger-sized QOL gains. However, they only partially
support the hypothesis that respondents’ WTP is higher for
younger patients because this was dependent on patients’ level of
disease severity in some scenarios.The results presented in Table 5 provide further insight into the
interactions between patients’ disease severity, the size of QOL
gains, and disease outcome and age of patients (see Fig. 1), and
into the effect of respondent characteristics on WTP. The results
indicate that respondents’ WTP for QOL gains of different sizes in
patients with different disease outcomes was dependent on pa-
tients’ age. Compared to patients aged 10, respondents’ WTP was
lower for patients aged 70 when the QOL gain was 10 points
(model 6: b -0.90) and higher for patients aged 20 when the QOL
gain was 20 points (model 6: b 1.35). Compared to patients aged
Table 5. Regression results (continued).†
DV: WTP Model 5‡ Model 6‡ Model 7‡
b (SE) 95% CI b (SE) 95% CI b (SE) 95% CI
Severity level§
(10 = reference)
- - - - - -
30 0.38 (0.50) –0.59, 1.35 0.79*** (0.28) 0.24, 1.33 0.80*** (0.28) 0.26, 1.35
50 0.71 (0.48) –0.23, 1.64 1.19**** (0.28) 0.65, 1.74 1.20**** (0.28) 0.66, 1.75
70 0.42 (0.49) –0.55, 1.38 1.23**** (0.26) 0.72, 1.75 1.22**** (0.26) 0.71, 1.74
90 0.08 (0.59) –1.08, 1.24 1.34**** (0.30) 0.74, 1.93 1.35**** (0.30) 0.76, 1.95
Agek
(10 = reference)
- - - - - -
20 –1.50*** (0.54) –2.55, –0.45 –0.35 (0.24) –0.82, 0.11 –0.17 (0.26) –0.68, 0.33
40 –1.45*** (0.54) –2.51, –0.38 –0.20 (0.23) –0.66, 0.26 –0.22 (0.23) –0.68, 0.23




- - - - - -
20 points 1.46**** (0.33) 0.82, 2.10 1.25*** (0.47) 0.32, 2.18 1.49**** (0.33) 0.85, 2.12










30 3 20 0.91 (0.69) –0.43, 2.26
30 3 40 1.35* (0.77) –0.15, 2.85
30 3 70 –0.67 (0.77) –2.17, 0.83
50 3 20 1.45** (0.69) 0.09, 2.81
50 3 40 1.28* (0.66) –0.02, 2.57
50 3 70 –0.83 (0.67) –2.13, 0.48
70 3 20 1.65** (0.70) 0.28, 3.01
70 3 40 1.58** (0.70) 0.20, 2.96
70 3 70 –0.01 (0.72) –1.42, 1.40
90 3 20 2.39*** (0.87) 0.68, 4.09
90 3 40 2.19*** (0.80) 0.63, 3.76
90 3 70 0.54 (0.81) –1.05, 2.12
QOL gain 3 Age
(QOL gain 10 points;
Age 10 = reference)
- -
20 points 3 20 1.35** (0.64) 0.11, 2.60
20 points 3 40 0.48 (0.57) –0.62, 1.59
20 points 3 70 –0.88 (0.60) –2.06, 0.29
50 points 3 20 –0.23 (0.93) –2.06, 1.59
50 points 3 40 –0.45 (0.77) –1.96, 1.06
50 points 3 70 –0.94 (0.74) –2.39, 0.50
Death 3 Age
(Full recovery;
Age 10 = reference)
- -
Death 3 20 –0.18 (0.72) –1.60, 1.23
Death 3 40 0.20 (0.65) –1.09, 1.48
Death 3 70 –1.06 (0.65) –2.33, 0.20
Age (of respondents) –0.35**** (0.08) –0.51, –0.19 –0.34**** (0.08) –0.50, –0.07 –0.34**** (0.08) –0.50, –0.18
Age2 (of respondents) 0.00**** (0.00) 0.00, 0.00 0.00**** (0.00) 0.00, 0.00 0.00**** (0.00) 0.00, 0.00
Male (Female = reference) 1.64**** (0.40) 0.85, 2.43 1.64**** (0.40) 0.86, 2.43 1.64**** (0.40) 0.86, 2.43




Medium –0.17 (0.66) –1.46, 1.11 –0.18 (0.66) –1.47, 1.10 –0.19 (0.66) –1.47, 1.10
High –0.68 (0.77) –2.19, 0.82 –0.69 (0.77) –2.20, 0.81 –0.69 (0.77) –2.20, 0.82
Household income††
(Thousands)
1.45**** (0.28) 0.90, 2.00 1.45**** (0.28) 0.90, 2.00 1.44**** (0.28) 0.89, 1.99
continued on next page
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Table 5. Continued
DV: WTP Model 5‡ Model 6‡ Model 7‡
b (SE) 95% CI b (SE) 95% CI b (SE) 95% CI
QOL (0-100 VAS) 0.02** (0.01) 0.00, 0.04 0.02** (0.01) 0.00, 0.04 0.02** (0.01) 0.00, 0.04
CV task –0.85**** (0.13) –1.10, –0.60 –0.87**** (0.13) –1.13, –0.62 –0.86**** (0.13) –1.12, –0.61
Constant 11.89**** (2.25) 7.47, 16.30 11.27**** (2.21) 6.94, 15.61 11.26**** (2.21) 6.92, 15.60
R2 overall 0.07 0.07 0.07
n (observations; groups)‡‡ 3250; 1235 3250; 1235 3250; 1235
CV indicates contingent valuation; DV, dependent variable; NS, not stated; QOL, health-related quality of life; VAS, visual analogue scale (ranging from 0 “dead” to 100
“full health”); WTP, willingness to pay (in V per month for the duration of 1 year).
*P , .10; **P , .05; ***P , .01; ****P , .001.
†Note that models 527 are based on the data obtained in part 2 and 3 of the questionnaire.
‡Note that the Severity, Age, QOL gain, and Death coefficients cannot always be directly compared between the models. The coefficients of scenario characteristics for
which no interaction effect is estimated represent main effects, and the coefficients of scenario characteristics for which an interaction effect is estimated represent
conditional effects.
§Severity is operationalized in terms of disease-related QOL loss and measured in points from 100 on the VAS.
ǁAge at onset of the disease (in years).
{Disease outcome 1 year after falling ill.
#Low = lower vocational and primary school, Medium = middle vocational and secondary school, High = higher vocational and academic education.
†Household income is adjusted for household size and calculated as household income / (household size)
ˇ
0.5.
‡‡Note that that the number of observations and groups is lower than in Table 4 as respondents who did not state their household income are excluded from Table 5.
8 VALUE IN HEALTH - 202110, respondents’ WTP was lower for patients aged 70 when the
patients fully recovered (model 7: b -0.99).
With regard to respondent characteristics, a higher age was
associated with a lower WTP (models 4 to 6: b -0.34 to -0.35).
Being male (models 5 to 7: b 1.64), having children (models 5 to 7:
b 0.99 to 1.02), having a higher (adjusted) household income
(models 5 to 7: b 1.44 to 1.45), and a higher QOL (models 5 to 7: b
0.02) were also associated with a higher WTP.
The results confirm the theoretical validity of the elicited WTP.
The sensitivity analyses indicated that respondents’ stated WTP in
the practice task had a marginal effect on the stated WTP in the
subsequent tasks (models 1 to 7: b 0.01) and that our results were
robust.Discussion
Our aim was to examine the WTP for QOL gains in relation to
the disease severity and age of patients in a representative sample
of the general public in The Netherlands. Furthermore, our aim
was to examine whether the WTP was different between QOL
gains in patients who fully recovered and patients who died 1 year
after falling ill, and whether the WTP was sensitive to scale. Our
main findings are that the WTP is generally higher for QOL gains
in patients with a higher level of disease severity and younger age,
and for larger-sized gains, but is lower for gains in patients who
die 1 year after falling ill. However, the relations were nonlinear
and context dependent. For example, the WTP was higher for QOL
gains in patients aged 10 than for gains in patients aged 20 and 40
when patients had a severity level of 10, but the WTP was higher
for patients aged 20 and 40 from severity levels 50 and 70 onward.
The WTP for QOL gains in patients aged 70 was consistently lower
than for gains in younger patients. This may be explained by the
fact that these patients already had their “fair share of life” at
onset of the disease or that less than “full health” is more accepted
at an older age.44,55–57
We would like to make four remarks in relation to our findings.
First, we applied a SIP perspective for eliciting respondents’ WTP;
therefore, our findings can be driven by self-regarding as well as
other-regarding preferences of respondents. Although weinvestigated the potential influence of observable self-regarding
preferences (eg, associated with having children and re-
spondents’ proximity to the age of patients), we acknowledge that
unobservable self-regarding preferences (eg, associated with the
probability of respondents’ own need for treatment) may have
impacted our results. Second, our findings need to be considered
in relation to the applied design. The WTP for QOL gains may
differ when elicited on full QOL and age scales, in combination
with LE gains, or from a social perspective that excludes re-
spondents from the hypothetical patient group.48 Third, we
observed considerable preference heterogeneity, which is consis-
tent with the findings of other studies that examined societal
preferences in this context.1,10,12,47 Accounting for (some of) this
heterogeneity in resource-allocation decisions may be possible
and worth pursuing, especially when aiming to align the out-
comes of such decisions with societal preferences. However, our
results and those of other related studies indicate that societal
preferences are complex, and, consequently, there will likely al-
ways be groups in society who do (not) agree with decisions made
(based on average values). Finally, the (differences in) statedWTPs
could be considered modest. However, they need to be considered
in relation to the respondent instruction that the increase in
monthly basic health-insurance premium would apply to all adult
inhabitants of The Netherlands for the duration of 1 year. Hence,
on an aggregated level the (differences in) WTP per QALY can be
considered substantial. The treatment generates 1000 QALYs (ie,
10 000 patients 3 0.1 QALY), and hence, on average, WTP is ~1.3
million euros (calculated as 8 euros 3 12 months 3 13.7 million
premium payers/1000 QALYs). Although this value is much higher
than the monetary thresholds currently applied in The
Netherlands (see Text Box 1) and likely influenced by the scenario
characteristics (eg, the number of patients and certainty of QOL
gains), it should be noted that such high values are not uncommon
in preference-elicitation studies58 and, considering the high ICERs
of some health technologies that are currently reimbursed in The
Netherlands,59,60 also not in decision-making practice.
Our findings are consistent with those of other studies that
find societal support for attaching a higher weight to health gains
in more severely ill and younger patients.11,39,61–63 and to larger-
sized health gains.47 and with those of other studies that find no
Figure 1. Graphical presentation of interaction terms (mean
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-- 9support for attaching a higher weight to gains in terminally ill
patients.64–67 The latter is consistent with studies that find that
the public may attach a lower weight to health gains in patients
with an undesirable “end point after treatment.”58–60,68 Although
there may be a moral case for attaching a higher weight to health
gains in terminally ill patients,69 our findings—like those of pre-
vious studies64–67—suggest that empirical support for applying a
higher weight to these gains may be limited. This is recognized by
the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in
England, who recently proposed to replace their end-of-life cri-
terion (see Text Box 1) by considerations that relate more broadly
to the disease severity of patients in order to better align their
decision-making framework with societal preferences.69,70However, because these societal preferences are usually not
elicited in monetary terms, we are limited in our ability to directly
compare our results to those of others. However, we can compare
our results to those of Bobinac et al5 as they applied the CV
approach from a social perspective in scenarios similar to ours.
Both our studies found a higher WTP for health gains in younger
patients and larger-sized gains. However, in contrast to our find-
ings, Bobinac et al5 found a lower WTP for health gains in patients
with a higher level of disease severity and a higher WTP for gains
in terminally ill patients. This may be explained by the different
way in which they operationalized disease severity and the health
gain in the specific scenarios, ie, in terms of proportional shortfall
and the prevention of immediate death.5
The main strengths of this study lie in the use of a realistic
payment vehicle, pilot-tested payment scale, and 2-step CV pro-
cedure. Although we could have applied other methods (eg, a
discrete choice experiment) to elicit respondents’ WTP, the CV
method enabled us to approach respondents’ common decision
context and examine their explicit WTP (instead of, for example,
deriving their WTP from the trade-off between scenario charac-
teristics). Other strengths lie in the randomization of scenarios,
exclusion of speeders, restriction of the disease duration to 1 year,
standardization of patients’ risk of falling ill and dying within a
certain timeframe (ie, 100%, implying no uncertainty), the size of
the patient group and QOL gains, and the costs of treatment, as
this reduced the possible influence of an order effect, satisficing
behavior,71 cognitive biases associated with risk assessment72 and
of other considerations (eg, related to health maximization and
the budget impact of reimbursing the new treatment) on our re-
sults. We appreciate that the latter strength comes with the lim-
itation that our results cannot be generalized to other scenarios,
for example, in which the number of patients is uncertain, patients
are at risk of falling ill or of dying within a particular timeframe
(ie, introducing uncertainty), or in which patients’ lives are (also)
prolonged. Another strength that comes with a limitation is the
exclusion of protest zero valuations. Although including these
valuations would have confounded the estimated WTP, it should
be noted that the classification into protest and true zero valua-
tions is not always straightforward and inevitably has some
impact on results.73 Some other limitations need to be discussed
as well. A first limitation concerns the possible influence of
payment-scale characteristics on the WTP. We facilitated a more
exact mapping of respondents’ WTP on the payment scale by
applying a scale with a reasonable range and uneven intervals
between the value points.74,75 However, we cannot rule out the
possibility that the scale influenced respondents’ WTP, particu-
larly in the case of unstable or not (yet) well-formed preferences.74
We accounted for this by controlling for a time-effect and dis-
cussing the results in relative rather than absolute terms. A second
limitation concerns the hypothetical context in which we elicited
respondents’ WTP.76 Although the outlined context of a collec-
tively funded healthcare system is realistic, we cannot rule out the
possibility that their hypothetical nature increased the risk of an
upward “hypothetical” bias, in which case the stated WTP could
be an overestimation of respondents’ true WTP.77 However, we
also cannot rule out the possibility that their realistic nature
increased the risk of a downward “strategic” bias, in which case
free-rider behavior of respondents may have offered a counter-
balance.78 A third limitation concerns the inclusion of QOL gains
that (in some scenarios) fully restored patients’ QOL to 100 points
as this means we cannot distinguish between the effect of the size
of QOL gains from the effect of patients’ health being fully restored
on respondents’ WTP.79 A final limitation concerns the low R2
values of the regression models. We would like to note that our
aim was not to predict WTP, and hence to explain as much data
10 VALUE IN HEALTH - 2021variance as possible. Rather, our aim was to assess whether WTP
was influenced by scenario characteristics (ie, associated with the
disease severity and age of patients, the size of QOL gains, and
outcome of the disease) and the models successfully aided in
meeting that aim. Further research is warranted to obtain insight
into other factors that may influence WTP for QOL gains. This fell
outside the scope of the current study.
Our results are consistent with those of other studies sug-
gesting that equity weights based on end-of-life considerations
may not be consistent with societal preferences,64–66,80 at least
not if the weight is attached to QOL gains in terminally ill patients
as in the current study. Furthermore, our results are consistent
with those of other studies suggesting that weights based on
disease severity are consistent with societal preferences. However,
our results suggest that the weights may decrease marginally with
increasing disease severity, have a fairly narrow range across
severity levels (possibly narrower than the threshold range of V20
000 to V80 000 currently applied in The Netherlands), and are
dependent on patients’ age. Further research is necessary to
examine the robustness of these results in relation to the preva-
lence of a disease and the related budget impact of a new
technology.
Because there is much variation between the results and de-
signs of studies that examine the strength of societal prefer-
ences,68 there is still considerable uncertainty about the “exact”
weight. For example, a recent study estimated equity weights
based on patients’ disease severity in the range of 2.5 to 2.8 by
using the person-trade-off approach.11 Given the very limited
evidence on the WTP for health gains in representative samples
the of general public, further research is necessary to inform de-
cisions about the appropriate size and range of equity weights
and, in relation to this, the range and shape of the monetary
thresholds against which the ICERs of new health technologies are
evaluated. This may, for example, concern research into the most
appropriate design for eliciting the WTP for health gains from a
social or SIP perspective.
Conclusions
Our results indicate that the WTP is higher for QOL gains in
more severely ill and younger patients and for larger-sized QOL
gains. It is lower for QOL gains in patients who die. However, the
relations are nonlinear and context dependent. These results
suggest that—if the aim is to align resource-allocation decisions in
healthcare with societal preferences—currently applied equity
weights do not suffice.
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